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HEADQUARTERS 47TH WING
APO 520

E: MEF/RWE/JJR/amb

14 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of the mission of 8 March 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, 98th Bomb Group, APO 520.
Commanding Officer, 376th Bomb Group, APO 520.
Commanding Officer, 449th Bomb Group, APO 520.
Commanding Officer, 450th Bomb Group, APO 520.

1. Bombing Analysis:

a. The 376th and 449th did not drop any bombs today - although each penetrated into the target area. Two Squadrons of the 450th dropped on the alternate - MARIBOR M/Y - with very satisfactory results, while the other two units failed to drop on the target. In the 98th, two units (of six) dropped on the primary - KOMAROM M/Y - with very satisfactory results, three attacked the alternate at MARIBOR with very satisfactory results and one unit did not drop.

b. The 98th flew six squadron formations on today's mission - Two each from the 415th and 344th and one each from the 343rd and 345th. Results on the primary, KOMAROM M/Y, were very satisfactory. The first unit, from the 345th Squadron, could not pick up the primary so the squadron proceeded to MARIBOR M/Y. Intervening clouds made synchronization difficult and unsatisfactory results were scored. The second unit, from the 415th, also went to MARIBOR after finding the primary overcast. The Mickey aided the bombardier in getting squared away at the target. After Bombardier MACKIE picked up the Marshalling Yard, clouds obscured the briefed aiming point so he selected the round house as an aiming point and scored superior results. The third unit, also from the 415th Squadron, missed the I.P. at MARIBOR because of the clouds in the area. The lead bombardier was not synchronized on the target so he did not drop, however the number four ship dropped and other ships in the squadron dropped on this signal for unobserved results. The 343rd Squadron, flying fourth, started a PPF run on the primary - KOMAROM M/Y - in the hope that the bombardier would be able to pick up the target. Occasional glimpses of the target enabled Bombardier KNIGHT to complete synchronization and he led his Squadron in to score superior results. The fifth unit, from the 344th Squadron, made a P.D.I. run on the KOMAROM M/Y because of an inoperative auto-pilot. The bombardier could see parts of the target but just a few short seconds before bombs away he noted that he was synchronized on the choke point instead of the aiming point. He elected to leave his cross hairs where they were and scored satisfactory results. The sixth unit made a run on the primary but shortly before bombs away the Marshalling Yard became

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completely covered and the bombardier elected to hold the bombs. They were returned to base.

c. Due to a complete undercast at the primary, all Squadrons of the 450th proceeded to the alternate at MARIBOR. Although all units hit the I.P. as briefed, only two units dropped on the target. The first squadron, the 720th, had a normal - though short - run and scored satisfactory results. The 722nd Squadron, flying second, experienced a normal run but the bombs failed to go away at the bomb release point. Bombs were later jettisoned into the Adriatic. The third unit, the 723rd Squadron, missed the I.P. on the first approach so they made a 360 and came in for another run. This time the Squadron hit the I.P. and experienced a normal run. Bombardier EYER laid down a very good concentration on the assigned aiming point - scoring excellent results. The 721st Squadron, flying last, also made a 360 when they failed to hit the I.P. the first time. On the second approach the bombs were released from the lead ship at the I.P. Some ships dropped on the lead here and others jettisoned into the Adriatic enroute home. The two squadrons that did not drop on the target today were flying a new model ship in the lead. The release procedure in this model differs from that of previous models and lack of complete familiarity with the release system was the cause of these mishaps.

d. Neither the 376th or 449th dropped bombs today. Although all units went to the target area the undercast here and also at the alternate prevented any runs.

2. Navigation Analysis:

a. Rendy: Although the rendy plans had to be changed after part of the groups were air-borne, the rendy was successfully accomplished.

First force 449th depart GRUJ PT. at 11000' at 0954; at 0954 at 11000'
Second force 449th depart GRUJ PT. at 12000' at 0959; at 1005 at 12000'
First force 450th depart DUBROVNIK 11000' at 1003; at 1003 at 11000'
Second force 450th depart DUBROVNIK 12000' at 1008; at 1009 at 12500'
First force 376th depart GRUJ PT. at 13000' at 1014; at 1014 at 13000'
Second force 376th depart GRUJ PT. at 14000' at 1019; at 1016 at 14000'
First force 98th depart DUBROVNIK at 13000' at 1023; at 1024 at 13000'
Second force 98th depart DUBROVNIK at 14000' at 1028; at 1032 at 14500'

The second force of the 449th, which departed 6 minutes late as a result of the lead navigators misjudgment of his final turn, later managed to fall in trail properly.

b. Route out: Assembly points to keypoint DRVENIK at 13000 feet at 1030 for first force of the 449th, and at five minute intervals for each succeeding force. to ZALRAEGERSZEG to NAGYMEGYAR

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to I.P., VAGSELLIZE, to target.

The route weather was very good up to the LAKE BALATON area. There Cirrus clouds, vapor trails and low cumulus began to obstruct visibility increasingly. Times and altitudes at the keypoint were:

449th First force at 1030 at 15000 feet.
449th Second force at 1041 at 17,000 feet.
450th First force at 1044 at 14600 feet.
450th Second force at 1049 at 17000 feet.
376th First force at 1050 at 14000 feet.
376th Second force at 1052 at 18000 feet.
98th First force at 1105 at 14000 feet.
98th Second force at 1112½ at 14000 feet.

c. Target Area: The 449th found the target completely obscured and communicated the information to the groups in trail. Both forces of the 449th then returned their bombs to base since their gas was running low.

The first force of the 450th turned for MARIBOR when it observed that the primary was overcast and both squadrons hit the I.P. The second force of the 450th received word before it reached the I.P. that the primary was overcast and turned for MARIBOR. The first squadron made a 360, because it was not properly spaced at the I.P. on the first attempt, and then passed two miles right of the I.P. The second squadron hit the I.P. squarely.

The 376th also turned to attack MARIBOR just before it reached the I.P. for KOMAROM, however, the runs were abortive because of heavy cloud interference and a shortend bomb run resulting from cutting the I.P. short.

The 98th also received word that visual bombing was not possible at the primary, but since the weather seemed to be slightly improving, the air commander chose to attempt a run. The first force hit the I.P. but found the target still socked in, so it turned to MARIBOR, which the first two squadrons attacked on the briefed axis. The third squadron could not locate the I.P. because of the clouds, but sighted the target to the left. An attempt was made to synchronize, but the run was too short. The second force of the 98th, hit the I.P. and then started its run on KOMAROM with PFF. The first two squadrons were able to complete visual runs. The third squadron, however, held its bombs for return to base, because it could not see the target. Times at the target follow:

449th first force at 1254 at KOMAROM
449th second force at 1305 at KOMAROM.
450th first force at 1345-1347 at MARIBOR.
450th second force at 1349-1351½ at MARIBOR.
376th first force at 1342 at MARIBOR.
376th second force at 1340 at MARIBOR.
98th first force at 1405 - 1409 at MARIBOR.
98th second force at 1328 at KOMAROM.

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- d. Rally: All groups rallied as briefed.
- e. Route back: The briefed route back was closely followed.
- f. Escort: A very effective escort of P-51's and P-38's was reported.
- g. Communications: Although there were no communication failures, both the 376th and 449th made the comment that the split force, because of the wide spacing, greatly reduces the efficiency of the communications.
- h. Ratings:
- 449th Navigation superior - logs superior.
 - 450th Navigation excellent - logs excellent.
 - 376th Navigation excellent - logs excellent.
 - 98th Navigation excellent - logs superior.

3. PFF Analysis:

- a. Twelve pathfinder aircraft were used to lead the wing on this mission. The H2X equipment was to be used for navigation only, as the target is in the area excluded to PFF bombing. Two failures were reported, one due to loss of crystal current and target return, the other caused by heavy interference.
- b. All bombing was visual. The one squadron from the wing which did bomb the PT was turned over the I.P. and squared away on the target by the Mickey operator. Operators reported identifying the target area from 35 miles away.
- c. Extensive undercast conditions of 7 to 10/10 cover was encountered from the LAKE BALATON area to the target and return. PFF fixes and winds were continuously used for navigation while over enemy territory.
- d. Scope photos were taken by all groups. Any that are suitable for target material will be forwarded.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL RUSH:

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HEADQUARTERS
98TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AC
APO 520 New York, NY

SPECIAL NARRATIVE REPORT NO. 189.
MISSION: 8 March 1945 - KOMAROM M/Y, HUNGARY.

9 March 1945.

I. CHRONOLOGY.

40 B-24's took off between 0825 and 0913 hours to bomb KOMAROM M/Y, Hungary. 29 effective sorties. 10 A/C dropped on the primary target 19.5 tons of 500 lb. (.10 & .01) RDX bombs at 1328 hours from 23,200 to 23,800'. Due to cloud cover over the Primary target 19 A/C dropped 36.25 tons on alternate target - MARIBOR M/Y, at 1404 to 1412 hours from 22,700 to 23,400'. 5 A/C were unable to pick up the target and 4 jettisoned 7.5 tons; 1 returned 1.5 tons to base. 1 A/C jettisoned .5 tons in the Adriatic due to rack malfunction and 1 A/C accidentally released .25 ton in target area. 1 A/C (2 tons) was lost. 4 early returns jettisoned 8 tons in Adriatic and 1 early return brought back 2 tons to base. 32 A/C returned to base at 1635 hours. 1 was lost, 1 is missing and 1 landed at a friendly field.

II. ROUTE AND ASSAULT.

Rendezvoused with 376th Group at 1024 hours at 13,000' at DUBROVNIK and with escort (12 P-51's & 6 P-51's) at 1245 hours at 47:35N & 17:50E - last seen at 1430 hours at 46:00N & 15:30E. Reached IP at 1400 hours at 22,800' and made left turn into target attacking on an axis of 180°. Rallyed right off target and continued on briefed course to base. Due to 7/10 cloud undercast at primary only 10 A/C were able to pick up target and bomb. Bombing was done visually.

III. RESULTS.

- A. Visual Observation Reports: At Primary - Cloud hindered observations but hits were observed in M/Y. At alternate - Aiming point well hit by one squadron. Cloud obscured bomb bursts from other squadrons.
- B. Bomb Strike Photos Show: A-1 345th Sq.- Maribor - Probable bomb bursts centered at D/15 and on western end of yard. Target proper is cloud obscured. A-2 415th Sq.- Maribor - Excellent concentration of bomb bursts in exact center of yard. Hits in repair shop area at west end of yard and four explosions in sidings area. Damage to tracks and wagons. A-3 415th Sq.- Maribor - Bursts approx. 4,000' west of yard in open fields. B-1 343rd Sq.- Komarom - Concentration across center of M/Y causing damage to tracks and wagons. Some bursts on either side of yard. B-2 344th Sq.- Komarom - Bomb bursts west of yard in residential district. Possible direct hit on south approach to road bridge and one near miss on bridge proper. B-3 344th Sq.- Did not bomb.

IV. ENEMY RESISTANCE.

A. Fighters: Nil.

B. Flak :

1. Squadron	Target	Bombing	Flak Experience	Lost at	Sev.	Slt.
	Time	Altitude		Target	Dem.	Dem.
343rd	1328	23,300	MAH	0	0	0
344th	1330	23,800	S/MAH	0	0	1
345th	1404	22,500	S/MAH	0	0	0
415th	1412	23,400	MAH	0	2	6
2. Route Flak:	At 1322 hours from 21,000' at 47:06N & 18:08E - S/MAH. At 1322 hours from 24,000' at 46:09N & 17:52E - MAH.					

V. SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS.

- A. Communications: At 1247 hours from 23,000' at 47:37N & 17:15E - 200 cars in M/Y.
At 1242 hours from 23,000' at 46:51N & 16:51E - 150 cars in M/Y.
- B. Flak Positions: Nil.
- C. Smokescreens : Nil.
- D. Naval : Nil.
- E. Others : Nil.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS.

- A. Total Losses: A/C 559 Green K collided with another plane of formation and spun into Adriatic. No sign of life was observed after plane crashed into water. 1 A/C is missing - last seen 30 minutes after target 50 miles southwest of Budapest on bearing of 75°.
- B. Damage : 2 A/C received major damage and 6 received slight damage from flak.
- C. Casualties : 11 man crew of Green K believed killed.
- D. Victories : Nil.
- E. Corrections : None.
- F. Airborne Interception Reports: No interception operator flew on this mission.
- G. Radar Reports and Observations: Nothing to report.

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Intelligence Officer.

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